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Introduction 
This paper was prompted by the Department of Work and Pensions consultation on CDC pensions1. 
It addresses some of the implicit and explicit concerns, questions and proposals contained in that 
paper. 
Our belief is that many of these concerns are avoidable difficulties and much of the proposed 
regulation unnecessary if the scheme rules (including governance processes) are appropriately 
designed. We shall offer one particular form of scheme as a straw man, but recognise that many 
designs may be both feasible and desirable for scheme members. 
The defining characteristic of a CDC scheme is that its targeted benefits may be reduced if the level 
of scheme funding does not warrant payment. There are no guarantees of the targeted benefits 
from any party. In the current DWP vision, these are occupational schemes but the role of the 
employer is limited to the payment of current contributions, and, unlike Defined Benefit schemes, 
there is no further recourse. This means that the fund, the portfolio of assets arising from 
contributions, is all there is. This determines the amounts that may be paid as pensions. 
We note that as currently envisaged in the consultation, it is likely that the initial promotion of the   
scheme, along with scheme trust deed and rules, and the appointment of initial trustees will be 
undertaken by a sponsoring employer. We will revisit this later. 
It is proposed that CDC scheme would be categorised as a form of the existing money purchase 
classification for legislative purposes. This is appropriate and reinforces the independent stand-alone 
nature of the scheme, as Pension Protection Fund cover would not apply.2 
                                                          
1 DWP (2018) Delivering Collective Defined Contribution Pension Schemes [available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/delivering-collective-defined-contribution-pension-schemes ]  
2 In summary, in relation to asset loss through fraud, see the Occupational Pension Schemes (Fraud 
Compensation Payments and Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2005 and the Pension Protection Fund 
briefing note “All you need to know … the Fraud Compensation Fund”: 
https://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/FCF_leaflet.pdf 
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The proposals that these schemes are required to be occupational trust-based pension schemes with 
their main place of administration in the UK, and that they will also need to be registered with HMRC 
for tax purposes, and be authorised by The Pensions Regulator before they can receive contributions 
are entirely non-contentious, if rather limited in the scope of application. 
As an aside, it would be quite difficult to offer the full flexibilities of CDC in a contractual framework. 
Governance 
The overall purpose of a CDC pension fund is to provide retirement benefits to its members at costs 
acceptable to the employer3 and members. Trustees’ duties in relation to the fund are to act 
prudently, honestly and in the best interest of the members.4 The Pensions Regulator states that 
trustees must ensure that pension fund investments deliver value for money and good investment 
outcomes. There are only a few academic studies that examine UK pension funds’ governance5. 
None of which look into the CDC arrangement. We now fill in this important gap.  
The independence and collective nature of the scheme endows CDC with the characteristics of a 
member mutual organisation. As this is organised as a trust6, it is important that the trustees7 should 
all be elected by the membership. The electoral process should be one person one vote and simple 
majority. There is merit8 in having one third of the trustees retiring in each year; retiring trustees 
may be eligible for re-election. Trustees do not need to be members of the scheme. 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that this is not a “one size fits” all situation as some large pension funds have 
“professional”/corporate trustees while other smaller DB funds have worker/employee trustees who clearly 
have less awareness of the role and responsibilities of the trustee. 
4 The Pensions Regulator (2010). The Trustee Toolkit, available at: 
http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees.aspx  (last visited 15 Aprl 2018).   
 
5 Myners Review, (2001); G.Clark, E. Carlewy-Smith, and J. Marshall, ‘The Consistency of UK Pension Fund 
Trustee Decision-Making’ (2007), Journal of Pension Economic and Finance, G. Clark, and R. Urwin, 
‘Leadership, Collective Decision-Making, and Pension Fund Governance’ (2008) available at:, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133015, J. Cocco, and P. Volpin, ‘Corporate 
Governance of Pension Plans: the U.K. evidence’ (2007), Financial Analysts Journal; Tilba, A and McNulty, T. 
(2013). Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership: The Case of Pension Funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 21; A. Tilba and J. Wilson, ‘Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: 
Examples of Pension Fund Engagement and Disengagement’ (2017) British Journal of Management, 11.   
 
6 It should be noted that in English law, a Trust is not a separate legal entity from the personalities of its 
trustees, i.e. a pension fund constituted as a Trust acts through its trustees.  
 
7 We follow the common convention and refer to the directors of Trustee Companies of occupational pension 
schemes as Trustees.  
8 By merit we mean both continuity of expertise on the trustee board and the member engagement that 
results from the frequency of elections.  But, as Tilba and McNulty (2013)* report, high trustee turnover (in 
DB) may not be positive for good governance. Academic results from studies of board composition are mixed. 
See also: (Tilba, A., Baddeley, M. and Yixi, L. (2016) Report for the Financial Conduct Authority. ‘The 
Effectiveness of Oversight Committees: Decision-Making, Governance, Costs and Charges. UK Financial 
Conduct Authority, [available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/market-studies/asset-management-
market-study]. 
* Tilba, A. and McNulty, T. (2013) ‘Engaged versus Disengaged Ownership. The Case of Pension Funds in the 
UK’ Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(2): 165-182.  
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Upon creation and authorisation of a scheme, the members should ratify or revise the scheme rules 
and the appointed trustees by formal vote. 
The chair of the trustees should be proposed by the trustees for confirmation or rejection by vote of 
the membership; the chair need not be a member of the scheme. Again, a simple majority will 
suffice.  
The duties of the trustees are similar in many regards to their fiduciary duties9 under defined benefit 
arrangements, but go further. The prime responsibility of the trustees is to set the terms of new 
benefit award annually. We include in this description designs where the contribution rate and 
benefit awards are fixed over some multi-year period. But overarchingly the trustees are responsible 
for ensuring adherence to scheme rules. These rules determine not just the operations of the 
scheme, but also its governance10. 
We have indicated the rules by which trustees may be appointed; in addition to this there are 
further matters which require the attention of the membership. The first and most obvious of these 
is alteration of existing scheme rules, where a super-majority (say 75%) seems appropriate. Perhaps 
less obvious is the question of scheme wind-up.  
There is an argument for some sponsor involvement, including possibly the right to appoint some of 
the trustees. This argument centres on the fact that the employer is the person who decided on 
whether to establish and offer the scheme to its employees (consulting, as applicable, recognised 
trade unions or agreeing the position of the recognised trade unions). On an ongoing basis, the 
employer is going to determine (with consultation or agreement with trustees) the contribution 
rates and benefit design – the job of the trustees is then to execute the benefit design. But with 
scheme rules and trustees adopted and perhaps adapted by the membership, this argument is weak. 
It is difficult to see that the sponsor has any further needed involvement, though there may be some 
residual, if formless, reputational risk to them. 
It is also an open question as to whether trustees should be elected from certain constituencies, 
such as active, pensioner and deferred members. We are not convinced by the arguments that they 
will represent the interests of their member constituency, as this would imply that they are not 
fulfilling the requirement to treat all members equally. We would suggest that an open attitude be 
taken to design variants such as this, and that time will inform us as to the superiority or not of the 
possible designs. 
Sustainability  
 
The consultation makes much of the question of scheme sustainability and proposes, among other 
things, that the Pensions Regulator should have the power of compulsory wind-up. The Regulator 
already has a power to wind up a pension scheme if it is in the interests of the members under 
                                                          
9 Fiduciary duty requires ‘the duty of loyalty’ and ‘the duty of care’, with trustees given a central role in 
ensuring their observance (The Law Commission (2013) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: Initial 
Questions at: https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/fiduciary-duties-of-investment-intermediaries).  
 
10 See The Pensions Regulator summary of the Duties and powers with the key duty is to act in line with the 
trust deed and rules [http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/role-trustee.aspx]  
See also Charity Commission for England and Wales (2018) Guidance The essential trustee, what you need to 
know, what you need to do.   
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/734288/
CC3_may18.pdf 
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Section 11 of the Pensions Act 1995.  In a scheme in which benefits may be cut, sustainability is an 
elusive concept. Similarly, the best or even just the interests of members is disputable11. We believe 
that wind-up is a matter for the membership in light of the experience and prospects for the 
scheme, and their tolerance and preferences for that. Accordingly, we would subject any decision to 
wind-up to a vote of the membership, which would be final and binding. Such a motion might be 
proposed by some minimal group of members, say 50, the board of trustees, or the Pensions 
Regulator. Such extraordinary measures would be complemented by disclosure rules and notice 
periods. We would also suggest that such measures, if rejected, should not be revisited more 
frequently than annually, unless there is a material change of the scheme’s circumstances. We 
would also note that non-agreeing members have the option to transfer out (to another scheme) 
their equitable interest at its net asset value. However, such action might result in loss of any further 
future employer contributions. 
 
Of course, the Pensions Regulator might intervene in the case of criminal behaviour, among which 
we would include wilful non-compliance with scheme rules. Another possible source of intervention 
would be changes to scheme rules which seek to advantage some members at the expense of 
others.  
There are, of course, domains in which scheme rules and the collective membership should not be 
sovereign. One obvious example is that of the treatment of future generations. Today’s current 
members have an incentive to defer costs and impose these on future generations. 
There is another aspect to the question of sustainability, that of the scheme objective. The 
consultation is clear and correct in promoting the use of best estimates, rather than prudently 
biased figures, in the management of CDC schemes. However, such a (best estimate) value will not 
be achieved 50% of the time. The size of the shortfall would be directly related to the volatility of the 
asset portfolio. If the objective is to pay out the full best estimate amount, it would be highly 
susceptible to over-frequent adjustment of the pensions paid. We will revisit this later.  
For now, the point we wish to bring out is the target return and its variability may be presented in 
many ways, and indeed schemes managed to reflect these descriptions. An 8% target return having 
a 50% chance of 6% may not be the same as a 6% target return having a 50% chance of 8%, but it is 
this latter viewpoint which is embedded in “buffer” approaches. This is an indirect reintroduction of 
the prudent bias, and carries with it the technical consequence of higher measured volatility around 
this lower “target”. 
Scheme Rules 
Award Setting 
Trustees (in conjunction with the employer) will be responsible for setting the terms of new awards 
each year. This annual setting of contribution rates and assumptions necessary to project benefit 
values should be on a best estimate basis. This process defines an accrual rate for the pension 
award. The basis of the award should be the trustees’ estimation of the investment returns which 
may be achieved on the contribution. It should not be prudently biased, nor should it reflect the 
                                                          
11 For example, there is a lot of vagueness and confusion about the nature of trustee ‘fiduciary obligation’ and 
what ‘best interests’ mean: UK Law Commission (2014) Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/lc350_fiduciary_duties.pdf; Sandberg, J. (2013). (Re-
)Interpreting Fiduciary Duty to Justify Socially Responsible Investment for Pension Funds. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 21(5), 436; Sievänen, R. Hannu, and B. Scholters, ‘European Pension 
Funds and Sustainable Development: Trade-Offs between Finance and Responsibility’ (2017) 26 Business 
Strategy and the Environment 914. 
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status of the existing pension scheme, its deficit or surplus. There is no cross-subsidy in this 
arrangement and no room for inter-member inequity. It is also clearly in compliance with trustees’ 
fiduciary responsibilities, and should be explicitly written into scheme rules. 
It is possible to structure this award setting process such that both contribution and pension benefits 
are fixed for periods of many years. The accrual rate arising from this arrangement may be higher or 
lower than the trustees’ expectations of investment returns. If lower, benefits may be increased by 
the application of the risk management rules, and if higher cut by the application of those rules. 
At first sight, this may be thought to create a weakness from the standpoint of sustainability, but this 
weakness may be tempered by the scheme’s risk management rules, as will be further explained 
later. More importantly, it is evident that the scheme has been created with continuity and 
sustainability in mind. The scheme has been created to be independent of any employer sponsor 
and future contributions are irrelevant. The average contractual accrual rate of the scheme will 
change a little from year to year as pensions are discharged and new awards are admitted, but there 
is no subsidy among members, current or future. With this in mind, the proposal to require the 
scheme to alter its investment strategies on cessation of further contributions by the employer, and 
to submit continuity or run-off plans at that time seems an unnecessary burden and expense. 
The idea that the asset portfolio should respond to this event by de-risking and buying less volatile 
assets is misplaced. This strategy also ignores the possibility that cash shortfalls may be bridged by 
borrowing, including the use of repo markets. It is, of course, recognised that the Trustee would be 
constrained by the need for the borrowings to be for short term liquidity purposes.12 
Scheme rules will need to cover a number of situations where assets may “leak” from the scheme 
such as transfers out (which can be done on an asset share basis) and commutation of part of the 
target benefit at retirement. For completeness, we will add pension sharing on divorce before 
retirement (same approach as for transfers out). 
A Design Element 
There is a choice to be made; we may have the contribution rate age-related or the award of benefit. 
Either is theoretically valid. This may be thought of as equality of benefit award or equality of 
contribution. We are familiar with equality of benefit from the DB world, and equality of 
contribution from the DC world. It really does not matter which is chosen, but this is a critical 
scheme rule. It sets the embedded degree of collectivism, around which equitable treatment should 
be applied. 
Many observers have criticised the standard uniform award independent of age of traditional DB. 
They have done so on the basis that the younger member’s contribution has a far longer period for 
investment to accumulate than the older member, and that there is subsidy of the old by the young. 
This is true only in part and is an incomplete analysis. Firstly, if returns are less than the embedded 
indexation, it is the old who support the young. In addition, the young should expect to grow old and 
in turn, to then benefit from this. Finally, of course, the benefit expected by the older member is 
largely determined and it will be framed in terms of purchasing power and today’s standard of living. 
By contrast, with a final salary or career average set-up, the younger member’s benefits are framed 
in terms of future purchasing power and (usually rising) standard of living. The younger member 
cannot replicate this feature in any financial market; the best they might contract would be 
purchasing power related. 
                                                          
12 As required by the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005, Regulation 5. 
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Valuation 
The accrual rate embedded in an award, mentioned earlier, defines the rate of increase of a 
member’s interests in the scheme over time. In addition to being the rate of return required of the 
asset portfolio, it is the appropriate rate at which targeted benefits should be discounted. Accrual of 
benefits at this rate returns the same value as discounting; it is time consistent. The various actuarial 
simulations of CDC schemes have all used the expected return of assets at the time of valuation as 
their discount rate. This introduces an extra and substantial degree of subjectivity into scheme 
valuations. It also lacks the property of time consistency and is a source of unnecessary action and 
expense. 
This use of the embedded contractual accrual rate is not a trivial difference, and has substantial 
consequence for the operation of a scheme. We illustrate this (figure 1) in a stylised manner below 
for a random set of discount rates (or point in time expected rates of return). We consider a 
sequence of 45 expected returns on assets – this is a reasonable approximation to the average term 
of a CDC scheme. The contractual accrual rate is then calculated as the average of these rates to 
date, as would be the case if annual contributions were uniform. 
Figure 1  
 
The relative volatilities are starkly different – the volatility of the contractual accrual rate is of the 
order of one tenth of that of the expected return on assets. The inference is that the simulations of 
scheme outcomes have overstated the likelihood of scheme cuts by a factor of ten. 
The most important aspect of this is that the volatility of scheme solvency approaches the volatility 
of the asset portfolio. 
The scheme accrual rate calculated in this manner introduces a pooling of investment risk among 
members; it averages the investment returns over a very long lifetime. The scheme average 
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commingles the average scheme rate as promised to the oldest member with the most recent 
awards to the youngest. It reduces the scheme’s sensitivity even to secular trends in investment 
returns. Moreover, this rate applies to members over their entire lifetime; there is no distinction 
between pre and post-retirement periods. We should not forget that with today’s levels of longevity, 
we expect, for a given constant rate of investment return, that the post-retirement investment 
return will be larger than that in the accumulation phase. 
Using the accrual rate accurately reflects the “promises” made to members, but using an actuary’s 
estimate of the potential returns on the asset pool distorts these promises, and introduces potential 
inequities among members. It also distorts the true financial position. If the expected return on 
assets is above the scheme’s accrual rate, then it understates the true liability value and biases the 
solvency ratio upwards. This may result in pensions being paid which should not have been. If the 
rate is lower, then unnecessary cuts may be imposed. 
There is a relation between the accrual rate and expected rates of return of assets. Each and every 
award is made on the basis of the trustees’ best estimate of the returns achievable. For the first 
year’s awards, the expected rate of return on assets and the accrual rate are the same. However, 
this historic rate is embedded into the scheme, and the second year’s awards are made on the then 
prevailing rate of return on assets, leaving the scheme with an overall accrual rate which is a 
weighted average of these rates. The weighted average is far smoother, less volatile, than the 
expected rate of return on assets13. This means that the already low rates of cuts found in those 
actuarial simulations of performance are very high biased. This would continue in the real world. 
Variation of the accrual rate will be discussed after the discussion of risk management and risk-
sharing rules. 
With a member’s interest calculated using this accrual rate, the scheme’s aggregate liabilities are 
simply the sum of all member’s interests. A member’s claim on the assets of the scheme is simply 
the amount of his or her interest as a proportion of the total scheme interests. This is also the value 
expected in transfer.  
By contrast, the assets are valued at market prices. The solvency ratio is defined as the ratio of total 
assets to total liabilities calculated in this way. The solvency ratio is the prime risk management 
indicator. 
Risk Management 
If a full pension is paid when the scheme’s solvency ratio shows a deficit, then the pensioner is being 
overpaid, by the proportion of the deficit. Scheme assets are depleted by the amount of this 
overpayment. Equivalently we may consider that the required rate of return of the scheme is raised 
to reflect this increase in benefits paid. 
While, strictly speaking, deficits are only of concern if there are pensions in payment, the risk 
management rules may serve to temper any overgenerosity in Trustee awards. The basic rule 
envisaged is the simple one of cutting pensions when the solvency ratio shows a deficit – the cut 
being applied to pensions in payment and in equal proportion to the equitable interests of non-
pensioner members. One of the great attractions of this approach is that it is objective being based 
upon observables, with only the projections of future pensions payments being based upon 
assumptions. We should note that as these assumptions apply in the main to all members, there is 
                                                          
13 It is also smoother than the simple average used in the illustration, figure 1. 
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little room for inequities to be introduced. They are also common to all approaches to valuation and 
risk management. 
This risk management tool, the cutting of pensions differs from that often used, the variation of 
indexation. That operates in a world of further assumptions, notably over the expected rate of 
return on assets. One of the difficulties arising from the use of this type of risk management tool is 
that it is based upon variation of a future target, and in many applications is introduced over time in 
an arbitrarily smoothed manner. With indexation as the tool it is rather difficult to maintain the 
equitable balance between members. 
Risk management of the form we advocate has a further advantage, that it may automatically 
temper excessively generous awards made by the trustees. Ordinarily, the new award may be made 
on terms which are similar to those applying to the stock of pensions and may be incorporated 
immediately within them. However, if the award made is made on terms where the accrual rate is 
materially different, say. higher by more than 50 basis points than the scheme average, the award is 
quarantined for a period, say, five years. If the returns on the overall portfolio result in this award 
showing a solvency deficit, then this award alone may be cut. Of course, these poor investment 
returns may also result in deficits for the stock of pensions, though this would be a different 
proportion. These risk management rules can and should be written as scheme rules. This is also 
true of other approaches to scheme risk management.  
The principal difference is that the approach we advocate has built into it increases in pensions in 
payment, and the risk management operates by varying all pensions (or member interest) by the 
same proportion. By operating in this way, the scheme is exposed only to the volatility of the 
investment process, as the risk management adjustment process will have filtered out the effects of 
differing mean returns (between target and portfolio). Indeed, with liabilities valued in the manner 
we have described earlier, the volatility of the scheme balance approaches that of the investment 
portfolio. 
The risk management methods described here eliminate any need for proposed peer review of the 
terms and assumptions in authorisation submissions. 
The exposure of the scheme to the volatility of the asset portfolio might result in unacceptably large 
variation in pensions payments on rare occasions, which leads to risk-sharing rules. The alternative 
to such arrangements is to de-risk the investment portfolio, but that brings with it lower expected 
returns and poorer pensions. It is also a move to consideration of the short-term, when CDC 
pensions are intrinsically very long term in nature, an attribute which risk-sharing can enhance. 
Risk-Sharing Rules 
In effect these are smoothing mechanisms intended to ensure the payment of pensions when these 
might not otherwise be justified. The central problem with the payment of full pensions when in 
deficit is that this creates an inequity between members, as pensioners receive more than 
warranted, and of course the asset pool is depleted by the amount of the overpayment. 
While payment in full would usually be feasible, on its own this would be subsidy of pensioners at 
the expense of non-pensioner members, including potentially future generations of members. It is 
therefore important that risk-sharing rules should treat all members equally. If pensioners are paid 
more than warranted by the funding status, non-pensioner members must be credited with a similar 
amount. 
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However, it is possible to devise many rules which will counter the underfunding problem, these 
usually only have the effect of delaying the imposition of cuts. There is also a risk that this will result 
in a very substantial depletion of the asset pool, the so-called “death spiral” from which recovery is 
impossible. 
Risk-sharing rules operate to the (mutual) benefit of all. The so-called subsidy of old by young in a 
final salary benefits base is in fact risk-sharing, since when returns are very low, below indexation, it 
is the young who gain. Risk-sharing might better be described as mutual support. 
We shall describe a simple set of risk-sharing rules, which happen also to be very effective. There are 
two dimensions to these rules: the first is concerned with the maximum length of time for which a 
deficit may be tolerated, and the second for the maximum amount which may be expended on 
pensioner support. 
The first of these rules defines a “cure period” during which pensions will be paid in full, subject to 
the maximum amount rule discussed later. It is related inversely to the magnitude of the deficit. 
Empirically, a rule which has worked well is that the forbearance period is the inverse of the deficit - 
a ten percent deficit should be cured within ten years, a fifty percent deficit within two years. 
Combined with this rule, a limit on the amount of support should be imposed, the maximum amount 
rule. As this is the amount by which non-pensioner members support pensioners, the scheme’s 
membership constituencies are a consideration. Empirically, for schemes where pensioners are less 
than 60% of the total membership, support to the maximum extent of 10% of the non-pensioner 
members’ interests avoids cuts arising from all but the most dire of investment outcomes. 
Where support has been provided to pensioners, the equitable interests of all non-pensioner 
members are increased by a similar proportion. The excess payments to pensioners lower the 
amount of the asset pool, and the increase in non-pensioner member claims offset this. It is an 
equitable arrangement. However, come what may, the support of pensioners when this is not 
warranted by the level of funding will raise the required rate of accrual, and investment 
performance. 
These risk-sharing rules do not conflict with the over-arching accounting identity of DC schemes, that 
assets are equal to liabilities. It is the adjustment of the accrual rate to reflect the lower asset 
amount and increased liabilities which ensures this. If subsequent investment performance does not 
support this higher accrual rate, benefits are cut for all. 
These risk management discussions have focussed on the downside of CDC pensions, but it should 
also be recognised that pensions may be increased if the investment performance and funding level 
merit this. This is also true of transfer values. The calculation of a member’s transfer value could not 
be more simple; it is just the net asset value of their proportional interest in total scheme liabilities. 
Transfer valuation procedures and calculations should be the subject of another scheme rule. 
Investment Mandates 
The investment horizon of CDC schemes is extremely long, covering both the accumulation and 
decumulation phases and of course an open ongoing scheme is sempiternal. The targeted benefits 
provide an explicit investment return target for the portfolio to achieve or surpass. The scheme risk-
sharing rules afford the investment mandate an additional freedom; the target return is then a 
target return to be achieved on average, and that average is determined by the volatility of the fund 
and the extent of utilisation of the risk-sharing amount limit. 
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Obviously. the fund should be managed in a diversified manner, as this reduces its volatility. There 
really is no case for de-risking the fund. Indeed, it is worth remembering that one definition of long-
term investment is reliance on the cash flows generated by the securities themselves, and not 
reliance upon the market. 
It seems perfectly reasonable to publish a statement of investment principles but this should be 
subject to member approval and have the status of scheme rule once approved. Implementation, 
including selection of fund managers is delegated to the trustees. Under the duty of care and PERG 
10.3 trustees can delegate the day-to-day management of the pension scheme investments to their 
investment fund managers in order to avoid the need for authorisation under the FSMA14. According 
to The Pensions Regulator: ‘Where the trust deed and rules allow you [the trustees] to delegate a 
power and you do so, you remain accountable for the actions taken. However, where you have 
delegated responsibility for investment decisions, your liabilities are generally more restricted. This 
is as long as you can show that you and the other trustees took appropriate steps to satisfy 
yourselves of the matters set out above’15. We also note that in fulfilling these responsibilities 
trustees should now follow FCA’s recommendations on disclosure of investment costs and charges 
via the IDWG template16.  
The consultation suggests that the DC charge cap of 0.75% p.a. should be applied at the level of the 
overall fund. With some mandates having longer than annual terms, it may be appropriate for the 
charge cap to also apply on average over that term. This would tend to favour long-term 
investments, such as some infrastructure projects, where the initial costs may be high. 
Under the Occupational Pension Schemes (Charges and Governance) Regulations 2015, the charge 
cap applies to what are called “administration charges”.  Transaction costs are excluded from these 
administration charges. Transaction costs are defined to mean the costs incurred as a result of “the 
buying, selling, lending or borrowing of investments”. While recognising that the charge cap does 
not apply to the costs of buying or selling investments, it is important that the presence of the 
charge cap does not prevent investment in long term investment projects.  
 Assumptions and Discretions  
If member trust and confidence is to be fostered, it is important that as many operations as possible 
are the subject of automatically applied rules, and not to trustee discretion. While we have offered 
one particular form of scheme design, there are many others upon which members may settle, but it 
is important in all that discretion and subsidy are avoided. ‘Discretion and subsidy’ was a valid 
description of the “with profits” model. While the design discussed here and the consultation place 
great emphasis on concerns with intergenerational inequity, with different designs embedding 
different potentials for inequity, this, the particular design, is matter of collective member 
                                                          
14 See PERG 10.3 for occupational pension schemes (OPS):  
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/10/3.html 
For example, trustees ‘…can make: strategic decisions, such as decisions: about the adoption or revision of a 
statement of investment principles as required by relevant pensions legislation; or about the formulation of a 
general asset allocation policy; or about prescribing the method and frequency for rebalancing asset classes, 
and the permitted ranges of divergence, following the setting of the general asset allocation policy; or about 
the proportion of the assets that should constitute investments of particular kinds; or affecting the balance 
between income and growth; or about the appointment of fund managers; or as to which pooled investment 
products to make available for members to choose from under a money purchase scheme’.  
15 The Pensions Regulator [available at: http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/trustees/role-trustee.aspx ]  
16 FCA Template [https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/forms/assessment-disclosure-template.xlsx ] 
Financial Times [https://www.ft.com/content/4b6e2e08-805f-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d]   
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preference and choice. And of course, schemes may evolve with experience. It is clear that scheme 
rules can maintain the balance among members, and indeed future generations, arising from the 
award structure. 
The consultation is very concerned with the number of scheme members and longevity pooling. The 
assumption made at award and the actual outcome may differ markedly. There are two sources of 
such differences: in trend and in idiosyncratic variation. The trend differences are not eliminated by 
the pooling of lives but idiosyncratic variation is reduced – by our calculations, with 700 lives of 
similar size pensions the standard error of the assumption is of the order of six months17. 
It is important to realise that all assumptions converge to the reality. The final salary of a 64 year-old 
is known with near certainty while that of the 25 year-old is heavy with assumptions. The process of 
convergence and updating of assumptions in light of experience is a slow process. Longevity and 
other assumptions may be updated alongside the setting of new awards. For example, it is the 
survival of a pensioner member which leads to revision of the distribution of their residual life 
expectation. 
Endnote 
The scope and capacity of CDC schemes is extremely wide. This arises from the unique manner in 
which members assume and manage scheme risk. The consultation unfortunately fails to recognise 
several important aspects of this and proposes many regulations which are rightly the concern of 
scheme governance and scheme rules. 
At a number of points the consultation proposes to require schemes to consider possible future 
developments, a process which would require the construction of (possibly complex) stochastic 
models. No matter what this will involve consideration of counterfactuals. This is neither necessary 
nor, given its cost, advisable. It is sufficient and optimal to consider only the current solvency 
situation. The accrual of awards, the promises made under the terms of those promises together 
with any adjustments to those members’ interests (from risk-sharing), constitute the liabilities, the 
denominator of the solvency ratio. The scheme assets at market prices constitute the numerator. It 
is true that the liabilities and the implicit accrual rate derived from them are based upon 
parametrically defined benefits. Theses parameters are best estimate assumptions which may prove 
wrong in the light of subsequent experience. However, it should be recognised that this problem is 
common to all approaches to pension liability valuation, and moreover that the assumptions will 
converge with time to the actual experience. 
Our contention is that inspection of today’s solvency ratio, together with risk management operating 
immediately on that is sufficient. It has the advantage that it is examination of the performance to 
date relative to that which was promised, even though that promise was an ambition rather than 
contractual commitment. It is a sound basis for good governance and risk management. 
                                                          
17 Similar results were reported by a leading actuarial consultancy at the Club Vita 10th anniversary seminar. 
Longevity and its hedging instruments are currently the subject of a major research initiative by the OECD’s 
private pensions group. 
